On the afternoon of June 12, 1940, Frederick Lindemann, whom British prime minister Winston Churchill had simply appointed as his scientific adviser, convened a gathering on the Air Ministry. Lindemann, identified to everybody as “the Prof,” prolonged a last-minute invitation to 28-year-old Reginald V. Jones, the comparatively obscure deputy director of intelligence analysis. The only real matter of the assembly was Germany’s progress in growing and deploying defensive radar programs, analysis that Britain was already doing with its personal secret Chain Dwelling radar stations. Because the assembly got here to an finish, Jones shocked everybody within the room with an alarming piece of intelligence he had discovered about solely that morning. He now believed, he advised the others, that the Germans had made a breakthrough in digital bomb-aiming that, if efficiently carried out, might very properly trigger Britain to lose the battle.
Jones, the son of a London postman, was, from an early age, one thing of an instructional prodigy. By age 22, having earned a doctorate in physics from Oxford College’s Balliol School, he launched into a civilian profession within the Air Ministry that inside only a few years had him within the company’s No. 2 intelligence place, specializing in digital and radio defenses towards air assault.
The appearance of business broadcast radio within the mid-Twenties was as near magic as anybody might have imagined. It was solely three a long time faraway from Italian inventor Guglielmo Marconi’s preliminary discovery that radio waves might ship messages by the ether, which led to his pioneering transatlantic long-distance radio transmission in 1901 (from St. Johns, Newfoundland, to Cliveden, Eire). Initially, the system might transmit solely the dits and dahs of Morse code, however inside a number of years voice transmission turned potential. With that improvement and some available elements, anybody at house with a little bit of technical talent might assemble a workable hi fi and, as Jones would later write, “conjure speech and music out of the air.”
Within the mid-Thirties, Jones’s analysis targeted on detecting infrared radiation emitted from sizzling plane engines approaching the British Isles. Whereas that intriguing work ultimately led to a useless finish, it superior his rising repute as a younger man to observe. Most necessary, his work had caught the attention of Frederick Lindemann.
Jones first got here to Lindemann’s consideration in 1931 whereas the previous was nonetheless a graduate pupil in physics at Oxford. Someday, the prickly Prof advised Jones in a post-examination interview that no pupil had ever answered his questions so successfully. Neither might have identified that years later they’d be working collectively on important protection work on the Air Ministry.
On the morning of June 11, 1940, Jones acquired phone calls from each Lindemann and Group Captain Lyter Fettiplace Blandy, the pinnacle of the Royal Air Drive’s Y Service, which was accountable for intercepting and decoding German radio indicators. Every name invited Jones to a gathering the next day. Lindemann’s afternoon assembly was to debate Germany’s functionality to detect incoming plane through the use of radio waves; Blandy’s morning assembly was extra of an off-the-cuff replace on Y Service actions. Jones carried the very best safety clearance, together with entry to intercepts from Bletchley Park, the place British intelligence analysts commonly decoded German radio messages despatched by their Enigma cypher machine community as a part of an Allied intelligence program referred to as Extremely.
Blandy opened a drawer in his desk and obtained proper all the way down to enterprise. “Does this imply something to you?” he requested Jones, handing him a scrap of paper. “It doesn’t appear to imply something to anybody right here.”
Jones learn the Extremely English translation: “Cleves Knickebein is established at place 53 levels 24 minutes North and 1 diploma West.”
Jones immediately realized that the required place was a degree in England, decided to be on the Nice North Highway a couple of mile south of Retford within the Midlands. He knew that Germany had a radio beam transmitter referred to as Knickebeinat Cleves (or Kleves, a metropolis on its western border) and that the British had confirmed the existence of this slim wave beam over England. To Jones, the title Knickebein (“crooked leg,” in English) advised an intersection of some type, maybe a second beam that intersected the primary—briefly, a precision “X marks the spot” bomb-dropping gadget. Additional, he mentioned, it offered a chance to place up a false cross-beam that may trigger the Germans to drop their bombs on decoy targets. In any occasion, the decoded message meant that the Luftwaffe, the German air pressure, was growing the power to precision-bomb England in any climate, day or evening.
When Jones was requested about Germany’s defensive radar capabilities on the Lindemann assembly, he mentioned that whereas he was satisfied the Germans had them, he knew few particulars. He talked about what had grow to be referred to as the Oslo Report—an eight-page paper on German know-how anonymously despatched from Norway that solely Jones and some others had taken critically. Close to the tip of the assembly, Jones matter-of-factly dropped a bomb of his personal. He reported his evaluation of the KnickebeinUltra transmission, which he had learn that morning in Blandy’s workplace; with that, he mentioned, the items all match collectively, leaving him satisfied that the Germans had an digital two-beam intersecting system for bombing England. Requested to broaden on his extraordinary assertion, Jones mentioned that primarily based on this proof and secretly recorded conversations of Luftwaffe prisoners, he believed Knickebeinhad been derived from the German “Lorenz” blind-landing set put in in German bombers: an digital support designed to information plane safely to the bottom in any climate by following a radio beam.
The idea actually wasn’t new to the Royal Air Drive; it had an identical low-frequency radio-range-type touchdown system put in in its plane as properly. What was new, Jones defined, was this new built-in two-beam precision bomb-dropping functionality. Jones had been tipped off to Germany’s scheme in a dialogue with a Royal Plane Manufacturing facility engineer who had examined a few of its crashed bombers. The person had talked about that the one factor uncommon concerning the Lorenz system was that it was rather more delicate than can be required for blind touchdown.
These blind-landing, “within the soup” cockpit radio-range touchdown gadgets had grow to be absolutely mature within the mid-Thirties. Pilots additionally used them for point-to-point navigation and holding patterns. These versatile programs had numerous names, together with “four-course radio vary,” “A-N,” “Adcock radio vary,” or typically merely “the vary.” With the Lorenz, the pilot, after establishing on ultimate method, would take heed to the Morse code indicators coming by his headset. If the airplane was to the left of the specified touchdown course, he would hear the A stream (a repeating letter A in Morse code: di-dah, di-dah, …); if he was to the fitting he would hear the N stream (dah-dit, dah-dit, …). When he corrected and eventually heard a gentle tone, he knew he was on the “equisignal”: on correct heading to land. (American pilots referred to as this being “on the beam.”)
If Jones’s idea—and to Lindemann and the others it was nonetheless a idea—was right, and the Lorenz system had been cleverly modified in addition to hid, the Germans would be capable of bomb England with close to impunity. Virtually predictably, the all the time tough Lindemann was the largest skeptic. The beam wouldn’t work, he mentioned, as a result of the brief waves wouldn’t bend across the curvature of the earth. Jones, armed with computations from Thomas Lydwell Eckersley of the Marconi Firm, assured Lindemann that the waves would bend. The following day Jones met with Lindemann and confirmed him Eckersley’s report. Lindemann then withdrew his objection and despatched a observe to Churchill concerning the significance of the brand new gadget. On June 14 a freshly captured Luftwaffe prisoner of battle admitted throughout interrogation that Knickebein was certainly a bomb-dropping system involving radio beams. To Jones, the proof was virtually conclusive.
On June 21 Churchill chaired a high-level assembly with Lindemann sitting on his proper and Lord Beaverbrook, the minister of plane manufacturing, on his left. Throughout the desk sat Air Minister Archibald Sinclair and all of the senior leaders of the Royal Air Drive. Jones was admitted 25 minutes after the assembly began. His first impression recorded the dearth of any secretaries; clearly this was to be an off-the-report dialogue. After sitting silently for a time, he was startled when Churchill abruptly requested him “about some level of element,” as Jones later described it.
“Wouldn’t it assist, sir,” Jones responded, “if I advised you the story proper from the beginning?” Momentarily shocked, Churchill then mentioned, “Effectively, sure, it might!”
Jones proceeded to talk with poise and with out notes for 20 minutes. “When Dr. Jones completed,” Churchill would later recall, “there was a basic air of incredulity.” Particularly, Sir Henry Tizard, an influential scientific adviser to Churchill, vehemently opposed Jones’s conclusions. After a moderately chaotic dialogue, Churchill lastly minimize to the chase. Turning to Jones, he requested: “What can we do?” The existence of the beams, Jones replied, ought to first be confirmed by a flight take a look at. Then, he mentioned, it was important to develop countermeasures to foil them. A lot to Jones’s delight, Churchill agreed, setting the plan in movement. Two years later, Lindemann advised Jones that Churchill had mentioned, “If we had listened to Tizard in 1940, we should always not have identified concerning the beams.”
The very subsequent day three two-engine Avro Anson utility plane had been despatched up, fitted with U.S.-made Hallicrafters S-27 wide-band receivers (basically ham radio tools), in addition to operators, to find the Knickebeintransmission frequencies. After an extended interval with out end result, one of many Ansons lastly picked up a beam. Then they discovered a second sign. The bearings had been in line with transmitters at Cleves and Bredstedt, Germany. Jones was jubilant. “In the middle of ten days [we went] from a conjecture to a certainty,” he later wrote. “[My work had] introduced me from obscurity to the very best stage of the battle.”
By September 1940, the Knickebeincountermeasures had been working properly, particularly throughout German evening raids when various visible aids had been typically unavailable. The digital countermeasures had been made more and more highly effective, to the purpose the place they degraded the enemy Morse code patterns into a lot static. The German beams had been nicknamed “Complications,” so it was solely becoming to name the British jammers “Aspirins.”
Regardless of this success towards Knickebein, for a number of months Jones had suspected that the Germans had been growing one other two-beam navigation-bombing system. Its existence was quickly confirmed by Extremely intercepts, coupled with but extra surreptitious recordings of current Luftwaffe POW chitchat. The Germans referred to as the system X-Gerät: X referring to the intersection of the beams, and gerät which means “gadget or equipment.”
British radio path finders had recognized the transmitting stations as Cherbourg and the Pas de Calais, each on the French coast. Inside a number of weeks that summer season, the indicators had been linked to a single bomber unit, Kampfgruppe 100 (KGr.100), which gave the impression to be working independently of different bomber items. British jammers had been shortly modified to dam these new “X-beams.” Following the sooner “Aspirin” precedent, the brand new jammers had been referred to as “Bromides.” However a supremely tragic communication error concerning jammer frequencies resulted in a failure to disrupt an X-beam assault on Coventry on November 14, 1940, and Luftwaffe bombers devastated the town. (Some historians have posited that Churchill coated up advance data of the Coventry raid to protect the Extremely secret, however Jones’s guide contradicts such assertions.)
Jones’s unrelenting work within the “Battle of the Beams” led him in that busy fall of 1940 to find one other radio navigation-bombing system. The principle clue to its existence was one thing he had lengthy suspected from references within the Oslo Report. He had additionally held at the back of his thoughts a mysterious Extremely intercept from June 27, 1940, which learn: “It’s proposed to arrange Knickebein and Wotan set up close to Cherbourg and Brest.” What was this Wotan? Jones questioned. He then telephoned Frederick “Bimbo” Norman, a good friend and fellow Bletchley Park affiliate, whose scholarship in German heroic poetry was extremely regarded, and requested him about Wotan.
“He was head of the German Gods,” Norman advised Jones. “Wait a second…he had just one eye.” However then Norman excitedly exclaimed “One eye—one beam!” and requested Jones if he might consider a system that may use just one beam. Jones mentioned that certainly he might, and the ensuing dialog opened the door to the potential for a 3rd, and doubtlessly most devastating, radio bombing system the Germans had devised.
In November 1940 an Extremely-encrypted message intercepted from a German transmitting station contained solely a single set of coordinates for a goal. When cross-checked on a map, the coordinates matched a British Military coaching middle in Dorset. All of it clearly pointed to a navigation system that wanted just one beam: the Germans had cleverly modified X-Gerät to re-radiate a second sign on a barely completely different frequency. The improved system supplied a distance measuring sign to associate with the course line beam. When the indicators overlapped, the enemy bomber can be over the goal. Based on Extremely, the Germans had named this third beam variant Y-Gerät.
The British instantly developed new countermeasures, which, oddly sufficient, utilized the British Broadcasting Firm’s massive industrial transmitter in London. By February 1941, the British had been in a position to shoot Y-Gerät beams again on the enemy on the identical frequency, solely with a lot increased energy. However by Could 1941, with Operation Barbarossa—the invasion of the Soviet Union—imminent, the Luftwaffe had transferred most of its bomber forces to the Jap Entrance. With that, the “Battle of the Beams” was largely over, although the digital tit for tat continued on and off for the remainder of the battle.
As World Battle II floor on, Jones stepped up his personal battle towards German know-how. The Oslo Report was frequently reviewed for brand spanking new leads; references earlier dismissed acquired renewed scrutiny. Jones had lengthy been haunted by a selected reference within the report back to radar, a know-how the British—with their nonetheless secret Chain Dwelling community—regarded with virtually proprietary curiosity. In July 1940, throughout the identical interval he was uncovering the Knickebeinand Gerätsecrets, Jones got here throughout a cryptic enemy intercept that talked about an air protection warning system it referred to as “Freya.” Jones acknowledged Freya as a Norse fertility goddess, however that alone wasn’t of a lot assist. On additional investigation, nevertheless, Jones found that Freya had a necklace, guarded by the watchman Heimdall, that gave her the power to see from horizon to horizon day or evening. Now we’re getting someplace, Jones thought: Heimdall had imaginative and prescient equal to radar. (These compromising German code names, by the way, are the first purpose that secret initiatives right now are given utterly random names.)
As Jones and his associates sought to find the Freyaearly warning radar stations, an Extremely decrypt talked about a second, comparable German radar—confirming one more merchandise within the Oslo Report—code-named Seetakt(Navy Tactical). This shipboard and coastal radar was dedicated to finding British ships. At that time the British nonetheless didn’t notice that the Germans had been in lots of respects forward in radar know-how. In 1939 Seetakt programs had been put in within the mild cruiser Königsberg and the heavy cruiser Graf Spee. The 2 Seetakt-armed cruisers prowled the Atlantic, sinking British ships till April 1940, once they had been sunk and scuttled. By the point the British found Seetakt, the Germans had been deploying it largely in destroyer-dimension patrol boats within the English Channel, they usually quickly had been compelled to fall again on optics as their major maritime range-finding technique.
By mid-1941, for Jones and his colleagues, the “Wizard Battle,” because it was typically referred to as, had hit full stride. They had been now specializing in the Freyanetwork, rightly judging it to be the higher menace to Bomber Command than X-Gerät. Unbeknownst to the British on the time, the Germans had first used Freya efficiently in December 1939, when it detected a daytime raid on Wilhelmshaven by a pressure of Vickers Wellington twin-engine bombers. It’s not properly understood even right now that in 1941 Freyawas extra technically superior than the British Chain Dwelling system, providing increased decision and detection of smaller targets. The British have efficiently nurtured the parable that their Chain Dwelling radar was technically superior in the course of the early battle years, however it was as a substitute the distinctive means of the warning system’s Filter Room at Bentley Priory, Fighter Command’s headquarters, to type out obtainable intelligence and erect the absolute best protection.
By early 1942 the tables within the “secret battle” started handing over favor of the Allies.
Luckily for the British, in the course of the Battle of Britain the Freya community was incomplete, leaving massive gaps in its protection, whereas Chain Dwelling was absolutely operational. Some students have advised that this disparity took place as a result of the British had been in a defensive posture, whereas the Germans, with essentially the most highly effective navy on the earth, had been strictly offensively oriented and had a blind spot when it got here to their very own protection.
Nonetheless, by late 1941, because of Britain’s intensifying assaults on their cities, the Germans had grow to be absolutely engaged in strengthening their air protection community, with Luftwaffe commander Hermann Göring placing Colonel Josef Kammhuber accountable for the trouble. The Allies dubbed the brand new air protection community, which included the Freya stations, the “Kammhuber Line,” and it proved very efficient. The RAF Bomber Command aircrew losses had been staggering, with greater than 55,000 males killed in motion out of a complete of 125,000; the U.S. VIII Bomber Command had about 44,000 crew members killed in motion.
By early 1942 the tables within the “secret battle” started handing over favor of the Allies. Jones, who was now primarily concentrating on digital countermeasures towards enemy air defenses, was turning into more and more influential in different areas. On studying of the unfastened formations and timetables of Bomber Command assaults, for instance, Jones urged a shift to regular, concentrated bomber streams, which overwhelmed German defenses. In the meantime, the introduction of the Allied Gee and Oboe radio navigation bombing programs (combining digital course and distance indicators) to air operations made deep penetration missions much more profitable. The preliminary use of this new bomber stream tactic resulted within the immensely profitable first 1,000 RAF bomber raids towards Cologne on Could 30, 1942. But the cat-and-mouse recreation continued: German digital defenses as soon as once more caught up when the Kammhuber Line was accomplished and Luftwaffe fighters loved renewed success towards British bomber raids.
It was throughout this era of the battle that Jones’s repute as a scientist soared. As early as 1937, he had posited that steel foil falling by the air would create radar echoes. After battle broke out, he and Welsh physicist Joan Curran devised a manner for British bombers to masks their method by dropping strips of foil, which they referred to as “Window,” minimize to the wavelength of the enemy’s radar. (The identical know-how, now referred to as chaff, continues to be used right now.) Window was first used within the weeklong Operation Gomorrah towards Hamburg in July 1943, with excellent outcomes.
Close to the tip of 1941, one other line of Jones’s analysis led to one in every of his most spectacular accomplishments. Inspecting what the Nazis had been calling the Würzburgradar, Jones had grow to be more and more satisfied that it was now the RAF’s major radar menace. He requested intensive aerial reconnaissance missions over the numerous identified Freyasites, hoping that they could come across a Würzburginstallation as properly. On November 22, 1941, a Photograph Reconnaissance Unit Spitfire introduced again grainy pictures of a radar web site at Bruneval, a coastal village close to Le Havre, France. The pictures revealed a suspicious object on the finish of a well-trodden path main from the station.
A daring PRU Spitfire pilot, Flight Lieutenant Tony Hill, volunteered to make a harmful low-level recon go over the positioning on December 5. His footage revealed a 10-foot-wide radar dish—what got here to be referred to as a Würzburg-Riese (Large Würzburg). Jones was galvanized. He realized the British had rather more to find out about this long-sought thriller radar, which Extremely intercepts had hinted at. Though he hesitated to suggest a commando raid, fearing that many lives can be misplaced, he lastly determined that such a raid was justified. After rigorously analyzing the radar’s location on detailed maps, he discovered a close-by seashore with a sloping method that was practically superb for a raid to seize as a lot of the positioning’s tools as potential. With Prime Minister Churchill all the time captivated with such adventures, Jones’s proposal shortly made it up the chain of command. The Bruneval raid—code-named Operation Biting and led by Main John Frost on February 27, 1942—was an incredible success.
An important results of the Bruneval raid was a fuller understanding of the capabilities of German air protection radars. The British found that whereas the Würzburgtypes had been significantly better constructed than their very own radars, they’d no provisions to deal with countermeasures. The British would go on to deftly exploit this key weak point.
One more of Jones’s counterintelligence coups was in the course of the latter levels of the Malta Siege of 1940–1942—what some have referred to as “The Nice Malta Bluff.” The Germans had put in highly effective new jammers on Sicily, which rendered ineffective the radar on the British-held island of Malta, a mere 60 miles south of the Sicilian coast. Malta was immediately within the path of enemy transport lanes from Italy that supported Italian and German forces in North Africa. The brand new enemy jammers might take out the island’s air protection early warning system, leaving Malta extraordinarily weak. The island’s Indicators Group requested Jones and his workforce in England for assist. No digital countermeasures had been obtainable. Jones knew, nevertheless, that the Germans judged the success of their jamming by monitoring British radio and radar exercise, and missing an alternate, he signaled Malta to proceed radar scanning usually and provides no clues that they had been in issue. The bluff labored. After a number of days, the Germans gave up and switched off their jammers.
Jones didn’t study the id of the writer of the nameless Oslo Report till an opportunity encounter within the early Nineteen Fifties, a reality he didn’t reveal till after the writer died in 1987. Appalled by Hitler’s invasion of Poland, Ferdinand Mayer, a German mathematician and physicist, had elected to ship his eight-page report back to British intelligence. Although he can be arrested by the Gestapo in 1943 for political exercise and despatched to focus camps, Mayer survived the battle. The Nazis by no means discovered concerning the Oslo Report.
In recognition for his position within the conception and planning of the Bruneval raid, Jones was appointed Commander of the Order of the British Empire. It will be the primary of many such honors. In the meantime, his battle “wizardry” continued by Could 1945, most notably unraveling the Kammhuber Line; discovering V-2 rockets at Peenemünde, Germany, and Blizna, Poland; discovering the launching tracks of the primary V-1 pulse-jet “buzz bombs” within the Baltic; and intelligence gathering for D-Day at Normandy. Jones, who died in 1997 at age 86, was undoubtedly accountable for saving the lives of 1000’s of Allied troopers.
In 1993, as a ultimate testomony to his twin positions because the “father of digital countermeasures” and dean of the World Battle II intelligence wizards, the U.S. Central Intelligence Company created the R. V. Jones Intelligence Award to acknowledge “scientific acumen utilized with artwork in the reason for freedom.” Fittingly, the primary recipient of the award was Jones himself.